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Abstract. In the recent years, several practical methods have been pub-
lished to compute collisions on some commonly used hash functions.
Starting from two messages m1 and m2 these methods permit to com-
pute m′1 and m
′
2 similar to the former such that they have the same
image for a given hash function. In this paper we present a method to
take into account, at the symbolic level, that an intruder actively attack-
ing a protocol execution may use these collision algorithms in reasonable
time during the attack. This decision procedure relies on the reduction
of constraint solving for an intruder exploiting the collision properties of
hash functions to constraint solving for an intruder operating on words,
that is with an associative symbol of concatenation. The decidability of
the latter is interesting in its own right as it is the first decidability re-
sult that we are aware of for an intruder system for which unification
is infinitary, and permits to consider in other contexts an associative
concatenation of messages instead of their pairing.
1 Introduction
Hash functions. Cryptographic hash functions play a fundamental role in mod-
ern cryptography. While related to conventional hash functions commonly used
in non-cryptographic computer applications - in both cases, larger domains are
mapped to smaller ranges - they have some additional properties. Our focus is
restricted to cryptographic hash functions (hereafter, simply hash functions),
and in particular to their use as cryptographic primitive for data integrity, au-
thentication, key agreement, e-cash and many other cryptographic schemes and
protocols. Hash functions take a message as input and produce an output re-
ferred to either as a hash-code, hash-result, or hash-value, or simply hash.
Collisions. A hash function is many-to-one, implying that the existence of col-
lisions (pairs of inputs with the identical output) is unavoidable. However, only
a few years ago, it was intractable to compute collisions on hash functions, so
they were considered to be collision-free by cryptographers, and protocols were
built upon this assumption. From the nineties on, several authors have proved
the tractability of finding pseudo-collision and collision attacks over several hash
⋆ supported by ARA-SSIA Cops and ACI JC 9005
functions. Taking this into account, we consider that cryptographic hash func-
tions have the following properties:
– the input can be of any length, the output has a fixed length, h(x) is relatively
easy to compute for any given x;
– pre-image resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computa-
tionally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that outputs, i.e., to
find any x such that y = h(x) when given y;
– 2nd-pre-image resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any second
input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given x , to find
x′ different from x such that h(x) = h(x′);
– hash collision: it is computationally feasible to compute two distinct inputs
x and x′ which hash to the same output, i.e, h(x) = h(x′) provided that x
and x′ are created at the same time and independently one of the other.
In other words, a collision-vulnerable hash function h is one for which an intruder
can find two different messages x and x′ with the same hash value. To mount a
collision attack, an adversary would typically begin by constructing two messages
with the same hash where one message appears legitimate or innocuous while the
other serves the intruder’s purposes. For example, consider the following simple
protocol:
A→ B :M,σA(M)
where σA(M) denotes A’s digital signature on message M using DAS digital
signature scheme in which only the hash-value ofM by a function h is considered.
The following attack:
A→ B :M ′, σA(M)
can be launched successfully if the intruder first computes two different messages
M and M ′ having the same hash value and then can lead Alice into executing
the protocol with message M .
Collisions in practise. MD5 Hash function is one of the most widely used crypto-
graphic hash functions nowadays. It was designed in 1992 as an improvement on
MD4, and its security was widely studied since then by several authors. The first
result was a pseudo-collision for MD5 [8]. When permitting to change the initial-
isation vector, another attack (free-start collision) has been found [10]. Recently,
a real collision involving two 1024-bits messages was found with the standard
value [21]. This first weakness was extended into a differential-like attack [24]
and tools were developed [12, 11] for finding the collisions which work for any ini-
tialisation value and which are quicker than methods presented in [21]. Finally,
other methods have been developed for finding new MD5 collisions [25, 19]. The
development of collision-finding algorithms is not restricted to MD5 hash func-
tion. Several methods for MD4 research attack have been developed [22, 9]. In
[22] a method to search RIPE-MD collision attacks was also developed, and in
[3], a collision on SHA-0 has been presented. Finally, Wang et al. have developed
in [23] another method to search for collisions for the SHA-1 hash function.
Goal of this paper. This development of methods at the cryptographic level to
built collisions in a reasonable time have until now not been taken into account
in a symbolic model of cryptographic protocols. We also note that the inherent
complexity of these attacks make them not representable in any computational
model that we are aware of. In this paper we propose a decision procedure to
decide insecurity of cryptographic protocols when a hash function for which
collisions may be found is employed. Relying on the result [4] we do not consider
here other cryptographic primitives such as public key encryption, signature or
symmetric key encryption, and assume that a protocol execution has already
been split into the views of the different equational theories. The decidability
proof presented here heavily relies on a recent result [5] that permits to reduce
constraint solving problems with respect to a given intruder to constraint solving
problems for a simpler one. This result relies on a new notion of mode. This
notion aims at exhibiting a modular structure in an equational theory but has
no simple intuitive meaning. In the case of an exponential operator as treated
in [5] the separation was between an exponential symbol and the abelian group
operations on its exponents, whereas here the separation is introduced between
the application of the hash function and the functions employed by the intruder
to find collisions.
Outline. We first give in Section 2 the definitions relating to terms and equa-
tional theories. We then present in Section 3 our model of an attacker against a
protocol, and how we reduce the search for flaws to reachability problems with
respect to an intruder theory. In Section 4 we describe in detail how we model
the fact that an intruder may construct colliding messages, and how this intruder
theory can be decomposed into simpler intruder theories. We give proof sketch
of these reductions in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Formal setting
2.1 Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables
X . For any signature G (i.e. sets of function symbols not in C with arities) we
denote T(G) (resp. T(G,X )) the set of terms over G ∪C (resp. G ∪C ∪ X ). The
former is called the set of ground terms over G, while the latter is simply called
the set of terms over G. The arity of a function symbol f is denoted by ar(f).
Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of
terms are written E,F, ..., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate
E ∪ F by E,F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t.
Given a signature G, a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol
of arity 0 in G. We define the set of atoms Atoms to be the union of X and the set
of constants. Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of variables occurring
in t and by Cons(t) the set of constants occurring in t. We denote by Atoms(t)
the set Var(t) ∪ Cons(t). A substitution σ is an involutive mapping from X to
T(G,X ) such that Supp(σ) = {x|σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ, is a finite set. The
application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ
(resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. E) where all variables x have been
replaced by the term σ(x). A substitution σ is ground w.r.t. G if the image of
Supp(σ) is included in T(G).
An equational presentation H = (G, A) is defined by a set A of equations
u = v with u, v ∈ T(G,X ) and u, v without free constants. For any equational
presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory generated by
(G, A) on T(G,X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances of
axioms of A. Abusively we shall not distinguish between an equational presenta-
tion H over a signature G and a set A of equations presenting it and we denote
both by H. We will also often refer to H as an equational theory (meaning the
equational theory presented by H). An equational theory H is said to be con-
sistent if two free constants are not equal modulo H or, equivalently, if it has a
model with more than one element modulo H. An equational theory H is said
to be regular if for all equations u = v ∈ A, we have Var(u) = Var(v).
For all signature G that we consider, we assume that <G is a total simplifi-
cation ordering on T(G) for which the minimal element is a free constant cmin.
Unfailing completion permits, given an equational theory H defined by a set A
of equations, to build from A a (possibly infinite) set R(A) of equations l = r
such that the ordered rewriting relation between terms defined by t→R(A) t
′ if:
– There exists l = r ∈ R(A) and a ground substitution σ such that lσ = s and
rσ = s′, t = t[s] and t′ = t[s← s′];
– We have t′ <G t.
This ordered rewriting relation is convergent, that is for all terms t, all ordered
rewriting sequences starting from t are finite, and they all have the same limit,
called the normal form of t. We denote this term (t)↓R(A), or (t)↓ when the
equational theory considered is clear from the context. In the sequel we denote
Cspe the set consisting of cmin and of all symbols in G of arity 0.
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are defined
recursively as follows. If t is an atom then Subsyn(t) = {t}. If t = f(t1, . . . , tn)
then Subsyn(t) = {t} ∪
⋃n
i=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in a term t are sequences
of integers defined recursively as follows, ε being the empty sequence. The term
t is at position ε in t. We also say that ε is the root position. We write p ≤ q to
denote that the position p is a prefix of position q. If u is a syntactic subterm
of t at position p and if u = f(u1, . . . , un) then ui is at position p · i in t for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We write t|p the subterm of t at position p. We denote t[s] a term
t that admits s as syntactic subterm. We denote by top( ) the function that
associates to each term t its root symbol.
2.2 Mode in an equational theory
We recall here the notion of mode on a signature, which is defined in [5]. Assume
H is an equational theory over a signature G, and let G0 be a subset of G. Assume
also that the set of variables is partitioned into two sets X0 and X1. We first define
a signature function Sign( ) on G ∪Atoms in the following way:
Sign( ) : G ∪Atoms→ {0, 1, 2}
Sign(f) =


0 if f ∈ G0 ∪ X0
1 if f ∈ (G \ G0) ∪ X1
2 otherwise, i.e. when f is a free constant
The function Sign( ) is extended to terms by taking Sign(t)= Sign(top(t)).
We also assume that there exists a mode function m(·, ·) such that m(f, i) is
defined for every symbol f ∈ G and every integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ ar(f). For
all valid f, i we have m(f, i) ∈ {0, 1} and m(f, i) ≤ Sign(f). Thus for all f ∈ G0
and for all i we have m(f, i) = 0.
Well-moded equational theories. A position different from ε in a term t is
well-moded if it can be written p · i (where p is a position and i a nonnegative
integer) such that Sign(t|p·i) = m(top(t|p), i). In other words the position in
a term is well-moded if the subterm at that position is of the expected type
w.r.t. the function symbol immediately above it. A term is well-moded if all its
non root positions are well-moded. Note in particular that a well-moded term
does not contain free constants. If a position of t is not well-moded we say it
is ill-moded in t. A term is pure if its only ill-moded subterms are atoms. An
equational presentation H = (G, A) is well-moded if for all equations u = v in A
the terms u and v are well-moded and Sign(u)=Sign(v). One can prove that if
an equational theory is well-moded then its completion is also well-moded [5].
Note that if H is the union of two equational theories H0 and H1 over two
disjoint signatures G0 and G1, the theory H is well-moded when assigning mode
i to each argument of each operator g ∈ Gi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Subterm values. The notion of mode also permits to define a new subterm
relation in T(G,X ).
We call a subterm value of a term t a syntactic subterm of t that is either
atomic or occurs at an ill-moded position of t1. We denote Sub(t) the set of sub-
term values of t. By extension, for a set of terms E, the set Sub(E) is defined as
the union of the subterm values of the elements of E. The subset of the maximal
and strict subterm values of a term t plays an important role in the sequel. We
call these subterm values the factors of t, and denote this set Factors(t).
Example 1. Consider two binary symbols f and g with Sign(f) = Sign(g) =
m(f, 1) = m(g, 1) = 1 and m(f, 2) = m(g, 2) = 0, and t = f(f(g(a, b), f(c, c)), d).
Its subterm values are a, b, f(c, c), c, d, and its factors are a, b, f(c, c) and d.
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm
will refer to subterm values.
1 Note that the root position of a term is always ill-moded.
Unification systems. We review here properties of well-moded theories with
respect to unification that are addressed in [5]. Assume H is a well-moded equa-
tional theory over a signature G, and let H0 be its projection over the signature
G0 of symbols of signature 0. Let us first define unification systems with ordering
constraints.
Definition 1. (Unification systems) Let H be a set of equational axioms on
T(G,X ). Anσ |= (Cα, E ⊲ S0m, Cβ ,S). H-unification system S is a finite set of
couples of terms in T(G,X ) denoted by {ui
?
= vi}i∈{1,...,n}. It is satisfied by a
ground substitution σ, and we note σ |= HS, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
uiσ =H viσ.
We will consider only satisfiability of unification systems with ordering con-
straints. That is, we consider the following decision problem:
Ordered Unifiability
Input: A H-unification system S and an ordering ≺ on the variables X
and constants C of S.
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=H S and for
all x ∈ X and c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Subsyn(xσ)
3 Analysis of reachability properties of cryptographic
protocols
We recall in this section the definitions of [4] concerning our model of an intruder
attacking actively a protocol, and of the simultaneous constraint satisfaction
problems employed to model a finite execution of a protocol.
3.1 Intruder deduction systems
We first give here the general definition of intruder systems, as is given in [4]. We
then give the definition of a well-moded intruder that we will use in this paper.
In the context of a security protocol (see e.g. [15] for a brief overview), we model
messages as ground terms and intruder deduction rules as rewrite rules on sets
of messages representing the knowledge of an intruder. The intruder derives new
messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying intruder rules. Since
we assume some equational axioms H are satisfied by the function symbols in
the signature, all these derivations have to be considered modulo the equational
congruence =H generated by these axioms. In our setting an intruder deduction
rule is specified by a term t in some signature G. Given values for the variables
of t the intruder is able to generate the corresponding instance of t.
Definition 2. An intruder system I is given by a triple 〈G,S,H〉 where G is a
signature, S ⊆ T(G,X ) and H is a set of equations between terms in T(G,X ).
To each t ∈ S we associate a deduction rule Lt : Var(t) → t and Lt,g denotes
the set of ground instances of the rule Lt modulo H:
Lt,g = {l→ r | ∃σ, ground substitution on G, l = Var(t)σ and r =H tσ}
The set of rules LI is defined as the union of the sets L
t,g for all t ∈ S.
Each rule l → r in LI defines an intruder deduction relation →l→r between
finite sets of terms. Given two finite sets of terms E and F we define E →l→r F
if and only if l ⊆ E and F = E ∪ {r}. We denote →I the union of the relations
→l→r for all l→ r in LI and by →∗I the transitive closure of →I . Note that by
definition, given sets of terms E, E′ ,F and F ′ such that E =H E
′ and F =H F
′
we have E →I F iff E′ →I F ′. We simply denote by → the relation →I when
there is no ambiguity about I.
A derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E0 →I
E0, t1 →I · · · →I En with finite sets of ground terms E0, . . . En, and ground
terms t1, . . . , tn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The term
tn is called the goal of the derivation. We define E
I
to be equal to the set
{t | ∃F s.t. E →∗I F and t ∈ F} i.e. the set of terms that can be derived from E.
If there is no ambiguity on the deduction system I we write E instead of E
I
.
We now define well-moded intruder systems and their properties.
Definition 3. Given a well-moded equational theory H, an intruder system I =
〈G, S,H〉 is well-moded if all terms in S are well-moded.
3.2 Simultaneous constraint satisfaction problems
We introduce now the constraint systems to be solved for checking protocols. It is
presented in [4] how these constraint systems permit to express the reachability
of a state in a protocol execution.
Definition 4. (Constraint systems) Let I = 〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system.
An I-Constraint system C is denoted: ((Ei ⊲ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) and it is defined
by a sequence of couples (Ei, vi)i∈{1,...,n} with vi ∈ X and Ei ⊆ T(G,X ) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and Ei−1 ⊆ Ei for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and by an H-unification system
S.
An I-Constraint system C is satisfied by a ground substitution σ if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have viσ ∈ Eiσ and if σ |=H S. If a ground substitution σ
satisfies a constraint system C we denote it by σ |=I C.
Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a
substitution σ is a solution of a constraint system C, by definition of constraint
and unification systems the substitution (σ)↓ is also a solution of C. In the context
of cryptographic protocols the inclusion Ei−1 ⊆ Ei means that the knowledge
of an intruder does not decrease as the protocol progresses: after receiving a
message a honest agent will respond to it. This response can be added to the
knowledge of an intruder who listens to all communications.
We are not interested in general constraint systems but only in those related
to protocols. In particular we need to express that a message to be sent at some
step i should be built from previously received messages recorded in the variables
vj , j < i, and from the initial knowledge. To this end we define:
Definition 5. (Deterministic Constraint Systems) We say that an I-constraint
system ((Ei ⊲ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) is deterministic if for all i in {1, . . . , n} we have
Var(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}
In order to be able to combine solutions of constraints for the intruder theory
I with solutions of constraint systems for intruders defined on a disjoint signature
we have, as for unification, to introduce some ordering constraints to be satisfied
by the solution (see [4] for details on this construction). Intuitively, these ordering
constraints prevent from introducing cycle when building a global solution. This
motivates us to define the Ordered Satisfiability problem:
Ordered Satisfiability
Input: an I-constraint system C, X = Var(C), C = Const(C) and a
linear ordering ≺ on X ∪ C.
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=I C and
for all x ∈ X and c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Subsyn(xσ)
4 Model of a collision-aware intruder
We define in this section intruder systems to model the way an active intruder
may deliberately create collisions for the application of hash functions. Note
that our model doesn’t take into account the time for finding collisions, which
is significantly greater than the time necessary for other operations. The results
that we can obtain can therefore be seen as worst-case results, and should be
assessed with respect to the possible time deadline in the actual specification
of a protocol under analysis. Further works will also be concerned with the fact
that given a bound on intruder’s deduction capabilities, a collision may be found
only with a probability p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
We consider in this paper five different intruder models. We will reduce in
two steps the most complex one to a simpler one, relying on the notion of well-
moded theories and on the results in [5]. We then prove decidability of ordered
reachability for this simpler intruder system.
4.1 Intruder on words
We first define our goal intruder, that is an intruder only able to concatenate
messages and extract prefixes and suffixes. We denote IAU = 〈FAU , SAU , EAU 〉
an intruder system that operates on words, such that, if · denotes the concate-
nation and ǫ denotes the empty word, the intruder has at its disposal all ground
instances of the following deduction rules:

x, y → x · y
x · y → x
x · y → y
→ ǫ
We moreover assume that the concatenation and empty word operations satisfy
the following equations:{
x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z
x · ǫ = x ǫ · x = x
Given these definitions, we can see terms over T(FAU,X ) as words over the
alphabet X ∪ C, and we denote letters(w) the set of atoms (either variable or
free constants) occurring in w. As usual, we extend letters( ) to set of terms in
T(FAU,X ) by taking the union of letters occurring in each term.
Pitfall. Notice that this intruder model does not fit into the intruder systems
definition of [4, 5]. The rationale for this is that, in the notation given here,
the application of the rules is non-deterministic, and thus cannot be modelled
easily into our “deduction by normalisation” model. We however believe that
a deterministic and still associative model of message concatenation by means
of an “element” unary operator, associative operator “·”, and Head and Tail
operations may be introduced. This means that we also assume that unification
problems are only among words of this underlying theory, disregarding equations
that may involve these extra operators. Another direction would be to extend
the current definition of intruder systems to take these deductions directly into
account. We leave the exact soundness of our model for further analysis and
concentrate on the treatment of collisions discovery for hash functions.
4.2 Intruder on words with free function symbols
We extend the IAU intruder with two free function symbols g and f. We first
define an intruder able to compose messages using a free function symbol g of
arity 4. We denote Ig = 〈{g}, {g(x1, x2, y1, y2)}, ∅〉 this intruder. It has at its
disposal all ground instances of the following rule:
x1, x2, y1, y2 → g(x1, x2, y1, y2)
We define a similar intruder with function symbol f. We denote If =
〈{f}, {f(x1, x2, y1, y2)}, ∅〉 this intruder which has at its disposal all ground in-
stances of the following rule:
x1, x2, y1, y2 → f(x1, x2, y1, y2)
Finally, we define Ifree intruder as the disjoint union of IAU, If and Ig, and we
have:
Ifree = 〈FAU ∪ {g, f}, SAU ∪ {f(x1, x2, y1, y2), g(x1, x2, y1, y2)}, EAU〉 .
4.3 Hash-colliding intruder
We consider a signature modelling the following different operations:
– The concatenation of two messages, the extraction of a suffix or a prefix of
a concatenated message and the production of an empty message, as in the
case of the IAU intruder system;
– The application of a hash function h for which it is possible to find collisions,
the hash-value of a message m denoted h(m);
– Two function symbols f and g denoting the (complex) algorithm being used
to find collisions starting from two different messages m and m′.
We assume that the algorithm employed by the intruder to find collisions
starting from two messages m and m′ proceeds as follows:
1. First the intruder splits both messages into two parts, thus choosing
m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2 such that m = m1 ·m2 and m
′ = m′1 ·m
′
2;
2. Then, in order to find collisions, the intruder computes two messages
g(m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2) and f(m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2) such that:
(HC) h(m1 · g(m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2) ·m2) = h(m
′
1 · f(m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2) ·m
′
2)
A consequence of our model is that in order to build collisions starting from
two messages m and m′ the intruder must know (i.e. have in its knowledge set)
these two messages. A side effect is that it is not possible to build three (or
more) different messages with the same hash value by iterating the research for
collisions. Formally, the core of the proof of this assertion is lemma 8.
In a more comprehensive model we might moreover want to model that col-
lisions cannot always be found using attacks published in the literature, but
instead that given a deadline, the probability p of success of an attack is strictly
below 1. This would imply that the application of this rule by the intruder
would, assuming independence of collision attacks, reduce the likelihood of the
symbolic attack found. In this setting our model would account for attacks with
a non-negligible probability of success as is shown in [2].
Leaving probabilities aside, we express intruder’s deductions in our setting
by adding the rule x → h(x) to the deduction rules of the Ifree intruder. As a
consequence, the previous description of the Ifree intruder enables us to model a
collision-capable intruder
Ih=〈Fh, Sh, Eh〉
with:


Fh = FAU ∪ {f, g, h}
Sh = SAU ∪ {f(x1, x2, y1, y2), g(x1, x2, y1, y2), h(x)}
Eh = EAU ∪ {(HC)}
For the following mode and signature functions the theory EAU ∪ {(HC)} is
a well-moded theory.
mode:
{
m(·, 1) = m(·, 2) = m(g , i) = m(f , i) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}
m(h , 1) = 0
Signature:
{
Sign(·) = Sign(ǫ) = Sign(f ) = Sign(g ) = 0
Sign(h ) = 1
Notice that in this case, every well-moded syntactic subterm of a term t is of
signature 0, and that every ill-moded strict syntactic subterm is of signature 1
(lemma 3). The main result of this paper is the following decidability result.
Theorem 1 Ordered satisfiability for the Ih intruder is decidable.
Ih
Algorithm 1

Ifree
Generic combination algorithm [4]

||
|
~~||
|
DD
D
!!
DD
D
Ig If IAU
Fig. 1. Reduction strategy
The rest of this paper is dedi-
cated to the proof of this theorem. The
technique employed consists in suc-
cessive reductions to simpler problems
and in finally proving that all simpler
problems are decidable. These reduc-
tions are summarised in Figure 1. A
proof for the decidability of the Ig, If
and IAU is given in Section 5.2. Algo-
rithm 1, that permits the first reduc-
tion, is based on the facts that the Ih intruder is well-moded (as seen above) and
that we can apply a reduction according to the criterion of [5] for well-moded
intruder systems.
CRITERION: If E →S1 E, r →S1 E, r, t and r /∈ Sub(E, t)∪Cspe then there
is a set of terms F such that E →∗S0 F →S1 F, t.
If a well-moded intruder system system satisfies this criterion, then the fol-
lowing proposition holds. It is a cornerstone for the proof of completeness of
Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1. Let I be a well-moded intruder that satisfies the criterion, and
let C be a deterministic I-constraint system. If C is satisfiable, there exists a
substitution σ such that σ |=I C and:
{t ∈ Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓)|Sign(t) = 1} ⊆ {(tσ)↓| (t ∈ Sub(C) and Sign(t) = 1) or t ∈ X}
5 Decidability of reachability
We present here a decision procedure for Ordered Satisfiability Problem for Ih
intruder system. Our technique consists in simplifying the intruder system Ih
to Ifree. We then reduce the decidability problems of ordered reachability for
deterministic constraint problems for Ifree to the decidability problems of ordered
reachability for deterministic constraint problems for Ig, If and IAU. We finally
prove the decidability for these intruder systems.
5.1 Reduction to Ifree-intruder
Algorithm We present here a procedure for reducing Ih intruder system to
Ifree intruder system that takes as input a deterministic constraint system C
= ((Ei⊲vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) and a linear ordering≺i on atoms of C. Letm = |Sub(C)|
be the number of subterms in C.
Algorithm 1
Step 1. Choose a number k ≤ m and add k equations hj
?
= h(cj) to S where the
hj , cj are new variables.
Step 2. For each t ∈ Sub(C) ∪ {c1, . . . , ck} choose a type 0, 1 or 2. If t is of type 1,
choose jt ∈ {1, . . . , k} and add an equation t
?
= hjt to S.
Step 3. For all t, t′ ∈ Sub(C), if there exists h ∈ {h1, . . . , hk} such that t
?
= h and
t′
?
= h are in S, add to S an equation t
?
= t′ to S.
Step 4. Choose a subset H of {c1, . . . , ck} ∪ {h1, . . . , hk} and guess a total order <d
on L = H ∪ {v1, . . . , vn} such that vi <d vj iff i < j. Write the obtained
list w1, . . . , wl. Let S’ be the unification system obtained so far, and form:
C′ = ((Fi ⊲ wi)1≤i≤l,S
′) with:


F1 = E1
Fi+1 = Fi ∪ (Ej+1 \ Ej) if wi = vj
Fi+1 = Fi, wi Otherwise
Step 5. For all t ∈ Sub(C) chosen of type 1, replace all occurrences of t in the Fi and
all occurrences of t as a strict subterm in S′ by the representant of its class
hjt . Let F
′
i be the set Fi once this abstraction has been applied
Step 6. Non-deterministically reduce S’ to a unification system S” free of h symbols,
and form the satisfiable Ifree constraint system:
C′′ = ((F ′i ⊲ wi)1≤i≤l,S
′′)
Sketch of the completeness proof. Assume that the initial deterministic con-
straint system is satisfiable. By Proposition 1, there exists a bound substitution
σ satisfying C.
– Let the number k chosen at Step 1 be the number of subterms whose top
symbol is h in Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓). The hj represent the different values of the
terms of signature 1. In the sequel we assume that σ is extended to the hj
such that all hjσ have a different value and are of signature 1.
– In Step 2, if Sign((tσ)↓) = 1 we choose the j such that (tσ)↓ = hjσ and add
the corresponding equation to S.
– In Step 3, we add equations between terms whose normal form by σ are
equals in order to simplify the reduction to Ifree.
– Step 4 is slightly more intricate. It relies on the fact that a rule in S1 may
only yield a term whose normal form by σ is of signature 1.
The subset H correspond to the subterms of signature 1 of Sub((Sub(Cσ))↓)
that are deduced by the intruder using a rule in S1. We then anticipate
the construction of hiσ with the application of a rule in S1 by requiring
that the corresponding ciσ has to be build just before (lemma 12). Given
the bound on k, this means that all remaining deductions performed by the
intruder are now instances of rules in S0. Since C is satisfied by σ there
exists a choice corresponding to quasi well-formed derivations such that all
remaining reachability constraints are satisfiable by instances of rules in S0.
– At Step 5 we “purify” almost all the constraint system by removing all
occurrences of a symbol h but the ones that are on the top of an equality.
By the choice of the equivalence classes it is clear that this purification does
not loose the satisfiability by the substitution σ.
– The non-deterministic reduction is performed by guessing whether the equal-
ity of two hashes is the consequence of a collision set up by the intruder or
of the equality of the hashed messages, and will produce a constraint system
C” without h symbol and also satisfiable by σ (lemma 9).
Justification. We now justify the completeness of the algorithm with the follow-
ing lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let R(Eh) be the completion of Eh intruder theory, and let l = r ∈
R(Eh). If l ∈ X then l ∈ Var(r).
Proof. Let l = r ∈ R(Eh). and suppose that l ∈ X and l /∈ Var(r). Let t1 and
t2 be two different terms in T(Fh,X ) and let σ1 and σ2 be two substitutions
such that σ1(l) = t1, σ2(l) = t2 and σ1(r) = σ2(r). Then, t1 =Eh t2. We deduce
that if l ∈ X and l /∈ Var(r) for a rule l = r ∈ R(Eh), all terms in T(Fh,X ) are
equals modulo Eh which is impossible. Then for any rule l = r ∈ R(Eh), if l ∈ X ,
we have l ∈ Var(r). 
Lemma 2. Let t and t′ be two terms in T(Fh,X ). If t→l→r t′ and l→ r ∈ LIh
then l /∈ X .
Proof. see proof in [4]. 
Lemma 3. Let t ∈ T(Fh,X ), we have:
– If t′ ∈ Subsyn(t) and Sign(t′) = 1 then t′ ∈ Sub(t);
– If Sign(t) = 1 then Sign((t)↓) = 1.
Proof. 1) Let t ∈ T(Fh,X ) and t′ ∈ Subsyn(t) such that Sign(t′) = 1, let us
prove that t′ ∈ Sub(t). Since t′ ∈ Subsyn(t), we have two cases:
– t′ = t, then t′ ∈ Sub(t).
– t′ is a strict syntactic subterm of t, then there exists an integer p ≥ 0, an
integer i ≥ 1 such that t|p.i = t
′. We have Sign(t|p.i) = 1 and by definition
of Ih theory, m(top(t|p), i) = 0 then m(top(t|p), i) 6= Sign(t|p.i). Thus t
′ is in
ill-moded position in t, which implies that t′ ∈ Sub(t).
2) Let t be a ground term in T(Fh) such that Sign(t) = 1. We have a fi-
nite sequence of rewritings starting from t leading to (t)↓: t →R(Eh) ... →R(Eh)
ti →R(Eh) ti+1 →R(Eh) ... →R(Eh) (t)↓. Suppose that Sign(ti) = 1, and let us
prove that Sign(ti+1) = 1. Let l = r be the rule applied in the step i. By defi-
nition of rewriting, there exists a ground substitution σ, a position p such that
ti|p = lσ, ti+1 = ti[p← rσ] and lσ > rσ. We have two cases:
– If p 6= ε, then top(ti+1) = top(ti) and thus by Sign(ti) = 1. We have
Sign(ti+1) = 1.
– If p = ε, then ti = lσ. Since Sign(lσ) = 1 and lσ is ground, we have top(lσ) =
h. Since lσ > rσ and by lemma 1, we have l /∈ X , and thus l = h(l′) for
some l′ ∈ T(Fh,X ). Since R(Eh) is well-moded and Sign(l) = 1, we have
Sign(r) = 1. We have three cases:
• r is a non-free constant. Since the only non-free constant in Eh theory is
ǫ and Sign(ǫ) = 0, this case is impossible.
• r is a variable. By lemma 1, we have r ∈ Var(l), and thus r ∈ Subsyn(l).
Since l is well-moded in Eh theory, we haven Sign(r) = 0, which contra-
dicts Sign(t) = Sign(r).
• r = h(r′) for r′ ∈ T(Fh,X ). This implies that we have rσ = h(r′σ), and
therefor Sign(rσ) = 1 = Sign(ti+1).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have Sign(ti) = 1 implies Sign(ti+1) = 1, which
proves the second point of the lemma. 
Lemma 4. Assume E and F are in normal form. If E →S F and t ∈ Sub(F ) \
{Sub(E)
⋃
Cspe}, Then F \ E = t and E →Lu F , with u ∈ S and Sign(u) =
Sign(t).
Proof. see proof in [5]. 
Lemma 5. Let A and R(A) be an equational theory and its completion respec-
tively. If A is regular then R(A) is regular to.
Proof. Let A be a regular equational theory, that is for all l = r ∈ A we have
Var(l) = Var(r). Let l = r and g = d be two rules such that Var(l) = Var(r)
and Var(g) = Var(d). Suppose that there exists a principal unifier σ of g and a
non-variable subterm l|p of l. Let us prove that the derived rule obtained by the
completion algorithm rσ = lσ[p ← dσ] preserves variables. We have Var(lσ) =
(Var(lσ) \ Var(lσ|p)) ∪ Var(gσ) and Var(lσ[p← dσ]) = Var(lσ) \ Var(lσ|p) ∪
Var(dσ), and since Var(g) = Var(d), then we have Var(lσ[p← dσ]) = Var(lσ) =
Var(rσ). This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 6. Let t ∈ T(Fh) with all its factors in normal form. We have: Sub(t)\
{ǫ, t} ⊆ Sub((t)↓).
Proof. Let t ∈ T(Fh). There exists a finite sequence of rewritings starting from
t leading to (t)↓: t →R(Eh) ... →R(Eh) ti →R(Eh) ti+1 →R(Eh) ... →R(Eh) (t)↓. Let
us prove the lemma by contradiction and assume that u ∈ Sub(ti) \ {ǫ, ti} and
u /∈ Sub(ti+1). Since u ∈ Sub(ti) \ {ǫ, ti}, there exists an integer q ≥ 1 such that
ti|q = u. Let l = l
′ be the rule applied on ti. There exists an integer p ≥ 0, a
ground substitution σ such that ti|p = lσ and ti+1 = ti[p← l
′σ] with lσ > l′σ.
– If u /∈ Sub(lσ) then u ∈ Sub(ti+1).
– If u ∈ Sub(lσ), by the fact that l is well-moded, u is in normal form and
u 6= ǫ, there exists x ∈ Var(l) such that u ∈ Sub(xσ). Since Var(l) = Var(l′),
we have u ∈ Sub(ti+1).
In the two cases, we lead to a contradiction with u /∈ Sub(ti+1). This concludes
the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 7. The intruder system Ih satisfies CRITERION.
Proof. Let E be a set of terms in normal forms satisfying the following deriva-
tion: E →S0 E, r →S1 E, r, t such that r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe. In order to prove
that there exists a set of terms F such that E →∗S0 F →S1 F, t, it suffices to
prove that E →S1 E, t. We have E →S1 E, r and the only S1 rule is x → h(x).
By definition, there exists a normal ground substitution σ such that xσ ∈ E
and r = (h(xσ))↓. Since Sign(h(xσ)) = 1 by lemma 3, we have Sign(r) = 1.
Since E, r →S1 E, r, t, there exists a normal ground substitution σ
′ such that
xσ′ ∈ E, r and t = (h(xσ′))↓. If xσ′ = r, we have t = (h(r))↓. h(r) is in normal
form, since all its factors are in normal form and r ∈ Sub(h(r)) \ {h(r), ǫ}, by
lemma 6 r ∈ Sub(t), which contradicts the hypothesis r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe. By
contradiction, we have xσ′ ∈ E and thus E →S1 E, t. 
In the following lemma, t =1HC t
′ denotes that there exists a one step rewrit-
ing between t and t′ using (HC) rule.
Lemma 8. Let t0, t, t
′ ∈ T(Fh,X ) such that t0 =EAU t =
1
HC t
′ and t0 = h(t1 ·
f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2). We have: t′ =EAU h(t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4).
Proof. Let h(m1 ·f / g(m1,m2,m3,m4)·m2) = h(m3· g / f(m1,m2,m3,m4)·m4)
be the ground instance of (HC) used between t and t′. Let us prove thatm1 =EAU
t1. If m1 6=EAU t1, we have either m1 is a prefix modulo EAU of t1 or t1 is a prefix
modulo EAU of m1. Let us review these two cases:
– m1 is a prefix modulo EAU of t1: then t1 = m1 · x and x 6=EAU ǫ,
then f / g(m1,m2,m3,m4) ∈ Subsyn(t1), then m2 ∈ Subsyn(t1). And we
have m2 = y · t2 with y 6=EAU ǫ, then f(t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ Subsyn(m2) then
t1 ∈ Subsyn(m2). We conclude that t1 is a strict subterm of m2 and m2 is a
strict subterm of t1 which is impossible.
– t1 is a prefix modulo EAU of m1: by reasoning as above on t2 which is a suffix
of m2, we can also prove that this case is impossible.
Thus we have m1 =EAU t1, and thus f / g(m1,m2,m3,m4) =EAU f(t1, t2, t3, t4),
that is mi =EAU ti for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and t
′ =EAU h(t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4). 
In the following lemma, t =1Eh t
′ denotes that there exists a finite sequence of
rewritings between t and t′ using EAU rules and where (HC) rule is used exactly
one time.
Lemma 9. Let h(m), h(m′) be two pure terms and σ be ground substitution such
that σ |=Eh h(m)
?
= h(m′). Then either:
or
{
σ |=EAU m
?
= m′
σ |=EAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m
′ ?= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
with x1, x2, y1, y2 new variables (modulo the commutativity of
?
=).
Proof. Let m1,m2,m3 ∈ T(Eh,X ) such that h(m1) =1HC h(m2) =
1
HC h(m3).
If m1 =EAU t1 · f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2 then, by lemma 8 we have{
m2 =EAU t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4
m3 =EAU t1 · f(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t2
Let Sm1 = {m| h(m) =Eh h(m1)} then, by lemma 8 we have Sm1 =
{m| m =EAU m1} ∪ {m| m =EAU t3 · g(t1, t2, t3, t4) · t4}.
We have σ |=Eh h(m)
?
= h(m′) that is h(mσ) =Eh h(m
′σ), and thus m′σ ∈ Smσ
which implies that either mσ =EAU m
′σ and then σ |=EAU m
?
= m′ or mσ =EAU
x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ and m′σ =EAU y1σ · g(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · y2σ
and then σ |=EAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m
′ ?= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
.

In the following lemma, we use Ifree intruder with Sign(ǫ) = Sign(·) = 0,
Sign(f) = Sign(g) = 1 and the notion of subterms values is defined as in [4].
Lemma 10. Let E be a set of terms in normal form. If E →∗S0 f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2)
and f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) /∈ Subsyn(E) then E →
∗
S0
t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2.
Proof. We have E →∗S0 f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) that is, there exists a finite sequence
of rewritings starting from E leading to f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2): E →S0 E1 →S0
... →S0 En−1 →S0 En−1, f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2). By hypothesis, we have f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈
Sub(En) \ (Sub(E) ∪ Cspe). Let Ei be the smallest set in the derivation such
that f(t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(Ei−1) ∪ Cspe) [i ≥ 1]. By lemma 4, the
rule applied in the step i of derivation is either x1, x2, y1, y2 → g(x1, x2, y1, y2)
or x1, x2, y1, y2 → f(x1, x2, y1, y2) and in our case it is x1, x2, y1, y2 →
f(x1, x2, y1, y2). By definition, there exists a normal ground substitution σ such
that ti = xiσ and t
′
i = yiσ for i ∈ {1, 2} and t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2 ∈ Ei−1. We deduce that
E →∗S0 t1, t2, t
′
1, t
′
2. 
Lemma 11. Let C be a deterministic constraint system of the form ((Ei ⊲
vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) such that no term appearing in C has the form f(t1, t2, t3, t4)
or g(t1, t2, t3, t4) for some t1, . . . , t4, and let (h(m1)
?
= h(m2)) ∈ S. Let σ be a
ground substitution which satisfies C. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have:
σ |= (Ei ⊲ S0m1) iff σ |= (Ei ⊲ S0m2)
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to prove that if σ |= (Ei ⊲ S0m1) then σ |=
(Ei ⊲ S0m2). Since σ |=Eh (h(m1)
?
= h(m2)), by lemma 9 we have two cases:
– If σ |=EAU m1
?
= m2 then the result is obvious.
– If σ |=EAU
{
m
?
= x1 · g(x1, x2, y1, y2) · x2,m′
?
= y1 · f(x1, x2, y1, y2) · y2
}
then {
m1σ =EAU x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ
m2σ =EAU y1σ · g(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · y2σ
Since σ |= (Ei ⊲ S0m1), we have (Eiσ)↓ →
∗
S0
(x1σ · f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) · x2σ)↓ and thus, (Eiσ)↓ →∗S0 (x1σ)↓ ·
f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) · (x2σ)↓ which implies that (Eiσ)↓ →
∗
S0
(x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓).
Since (Eiσ)↓ →∗S0 f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓), we have two cases:
• f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) /∈ Subsyn((Eiσ)↓), by lemma 10 we
have (Eiσ)↓ →∗S0 (x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓ and thus (Eiσ)↓ →
∗
S0
g((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) which implies that (Eiσ)↓ →∗S0 (y1σ)↓ ·
g((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) · (y2σ)↓. We conclude that σ |= (Ei ⊲
S0m2).
• f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) ∈ Subsyn((Eiσ)↓), there exists
vj ∈ Var(Ei) such that f(x1σ, x2σ, y1σ, y2σ) ∈ Subsyn(vjσ),
with j < i and σ |= (Ej ⊲ S0vj). Let l be the smallest inte-
ger such that (Elσ)↓ →∗S0 f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) and
f((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓) /∈ Subsyn((Elσ)↓). By lemma 10,
we have (Elσ)↓ →∗S0 (x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓ and thus
(Eiσ)↓ →
∗
S0
(x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓ which implies that
(Eiσ)↓ →∗S0 g((x1σ)↓, (x2σ)↓, (y1σ)↓, (y2σ)↓). We conclude that
σ |= (Ei ⊲ S0m2).

Lemma 12. Let C = ((Ei⊲vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a deterministic constraint system
such that no term appearing in C has the form f(t1, t2, t3, t4) or g(t1, t2, t3, t4)
for some t1, . . . , t4 and vj
?
= h(m) ∈ S. Let σ be a ground substitution such
that σ |= C and for all E ⊲ v ∈ C, there exists a derivation starting from (Eσ)↓
leading to (vσ)↓ where all steps use S0 rules except possibly the last one which
may uses S1 rule. We have either σ |= ((E1⊲ v1, . . . , Ej ⊲ S0vj , . . . , En⊲ vn),S)
or σ |= ((E1 ⊲ v1, . . . , Ej ⊲ S0v
′
j , . . . , En ⊲ vn),S
′) where S′ = S ∪
{
v′j
?
= m
}
.
Proof. Let C = ((Ei ⊲ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S), vj
?
= h(m) ∈ S and σ be a ground
substitution such that σ |= C. We have σ |= (Ej ⊲ vj) and vjσ =Eh h(mσ), that
is there exists a finite sequence of rewritings starting from (Ejσ)↓ leading to
(h(mσ))↓ where all steps in the derivation use S0 rules except possibly the last
one which may uses S1 rule. We have two cases:
– If all used rules are of type S0 then σ |= Ej ⊲ S0 h(m) and thus, σ |=
((E1 ⊲ v1, . . . , Ej ⊲ S0vj , . . . , En ⊲ vn),S).
– If the last used rule is of type S1 then (Ejσ)↓ →
∗
S0
F, (tσ)↓ →S1
F, (tσ)↓, (h((tσ)↓))↓ with (h((tσ)↓))↓ = (h(mσ))↓ and thus, we have two
cases for the equation vj
?
= h(m), If σ |=EAU t
?
= m then σ |= Ej ⊲ S0m
and thus we have σ |= ((E1 ⊲ v1, . . . , Ej ⊲ S0v
′
j , . . . , En ⊲ vn),S
′) where
S′ = S ∪
{
v′j
?
= m
}
.
Else, the hypothesis of this lemma (no term appearing in C has the form
f(t1, t2, t3, t4) or g(t1, t2, t3, t4) for some t1, . . . , t4) permits to apply lemma 11
which implies that σ |= Ej ⊲ S0m, and thus, σ |= ((E1 ⊲ v1, . . . , Ej ⊲
S0v
′
j , . . . , En ⊲ vn),S
′) where S′ = S ∪
{
v′j
?
= m
}
.

5.2 Decidability of reachability for the Ifree-intruder
We first reduce the Ifree intruder system to simpler intruder systems using the
combination result of [4]. We will consider the decidability of these subsystems
in the remainder of this section.
Theorem 2 Ordered satisfiability for the Ifree intruder system is decidable.
Proof. Ifree intruder theory is the disjoint union of IAU , Ig and If intruder
theories. The reachability problems of the three preceding theories are decidable
(Theorem 4 and Theorem 3). The result obtained in [4] prove that the disjoint
union of decidable intruder theories is also decidable. Thus Ifree is decidable. 
Decidability of reachability for the Ig-intruder. In this subsection, we consider
an Ig intruder system with Ig = 〈g, g(x1, x2, x
′
1, x
′
2), ∅〉. This intruder has at its
disposal all ground instances of the following deduction rule:
x1, x2, y1, y2 → g(x1, x2, y1, y2)
Theorem 3 Ordered satisfiability for Ig intruder is decidable.
Proof. Let C be an Ig deterministic constraint system. Since Ig intruder the-
ory verifies the convergent public-collapsing property of [7], S contains finite
equations and C contains a finite number of intruder constraints Ei ⊲ vi and it
is well-formed, we have ordered satisfiability problem for Ig is decidable by the
theorem 1 of [7]. 
Decidability of reachability for the IAU intruder. We now give a proof sketch for
the decidability of ordered satisfiability for the IAU intruder.
Theorem 4 Ordered satisfiability for the IAU intruder system is decidable.
Proof. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
– Transform the deduction constraints E ⊲ v into an ordering constraint <d;
– Check that <
def
=<d ∪ <i is still a partial order on atoms of C;
– Solve the unification problems with linear constant restriction <.
Let C = ((Ei ⊲ vi)0≤i≤n,S) be a deterministic constraint system for the IAU
intruder, <i be a (partial) order on Cons(C)∪Var(C), and let σ be a solution of
the (C, <i) ordered satisfiability problem.
Given a set of terms E ⊆ T(FAU,X ), let us denote KC = (Cons(C) \
letters(E)) \X . In plain words, KC(E) is the set of constants in C not occurring
in E. We are now ready to define <d as a partial order on Cons(C)∪{v0, . . . , vn}:
We set vi <d c for all constants c in KC(Ei).
Claim. For all σ, we have σ |= (C, <i) if, and only if, σ |= (S, <i ∪ <d)
Proof of the claim. Let us first prove the direct implication. Let σ be a
ground solution of the (C, <i) ordered satisfiability problem. By definition we
have that σ is a solution of (S, <i) ordered unifiability problem. Since for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n we have σ |= Ei⊲vi, we easily see that letters((viσ)↓) ⊆ Cons(Ei), and
therefore letters((viσ)↓)∩KC(Ei) = ∅. Thus σ is also a solution of (S, <d ∪ <i).
Conversely, assume now that σ is a ground solution of (S, <d ∪ <i). By definition
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n we have letters((viσ)↓)∩KC(Ei) = ∅, and thus letters((viσ)↓) ⊆
letters(Ei) \ X . Thus we have (viσ)↓ ∈ (Eiσ)↓ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and thus
σ |= (C, <i) ♦
Since unifiability with linear constant restriction is decidable for the AU
equational theory [20], this finishes the proof of the theorem. Note that the
exact complexity is not known, but the problem is NP-hard and solvable in
PSPACE [16, 17], and it is conjectured to be in NP [18, 13]. 
6 Conclusion
We have presented here a novel decision procedure for the search for attacks
on protocols employing hash functions subject to collision attacks. Since this
procedure is of practical interest for the analysis of the already normalised pro-
tocols relying on these weak functions, we plan to implement it into an already
existing tool, CL-Atse [14]. Alternatively an implementation may be done in
OFMC [1], though the support of associative operators is still partial. In order
to model hash functions we have introduced new symbols to denote the ability
to create messages with the same hash value. This introduction amounts to the
skolemisation of the equational property describing the existence of collisions.
We believe that this construction can be extended to model the more complex
and game-based properties that appear when relating a symbolic and a concrete
model of cryptographic primitives.
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